EQuality Process Announces Patent Pending Process for Anti-Counterfeit Detection
EQuality provides anti-counterfeiting process to combat rampant fraudulent electronic components
Largo, FL.- August 24, 2010 –
EQuality Process, Inc. (EQuality, www.equalityprocess.com) provides a reliable mechanism to ascertain the integrity of components through its newly patent-pending authenticity process, including a stringent visual inspection followed by documented testing and physical analysis. EQuality’s inspection process is designed to detect component conformance / counterfeit issues prior to receiving into inventory or release to manufacturing. Specifically, components are subjected to a rigorous processs involving physical inspection, digital microscopy, EDXRF Spectrometer analysis (to determine RoHS compliance), and decapsulation analysis to verify die level integrity and compliance (or combination or requested services). The EQuality process finds evidence of alteration and known authentic component indicator, and these services exceed Mil-STD-883TM2015, JESD22-B107C and Mil-PRF-38535H standards while being performed in an ANSI/ESD-S20.20-2007 certified facility. Equality provides a detailed Quality Report, including 3-D digital photographs, and a Certificate of Conformance. The patent pending process is now available to all military, aerospace, and electronics manufacturers, as well as component distributors and original component manufacturers who want to validate their own RMA’ed devices. Equality’s patent pending process is the industry leader in standardizing anti-counterfeiting processes to eliminate fake components throughout the electronics value chain.
EQuality Process
EQuality Process (www.equallityprocess.com) is an independent testing company headquartered in Largo, FL, EQuality is uniquely positioned with a newly patent-pending anti-counterfeit detection process that provides both product traceability and assurance of component supply. EQuality Process provides inspection, counterfeit detection and environmentally controlled storage for electronic components. Further, EQuality Process assists entities in the electronic component supply chains that focus on quality and long-term component viability. Performing to standards exceeding military and IPC/JEDEC specifications, EQuality Process will ensure that your electronic components are authentic and environmentally protected for up to 20 years.
Contacts
EQuality Process, Inc
Craig Zurman, President
craig.zurman@equalityprocess.com Office: (727) 586-6288 Ext. 224
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Two Chinese Nationals Convicted of Illegally Exporting Electronics Components Used in Military Radar & Electronic Warfare
Zhen Zhou Wu aka Alex Wu, owner of Chitron Electronics Inc. (Chitron-US), was found guilty of illegally conspiring to violate U.S. export laws and illegally exporting electronic equipment from the United States to China.
Source: United States Department of Justice - http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-nsd-580.html
Two Chinese Nationals Convicted of Illegally Exporting Electronics Components Used in Military Radar & Electronic Warfare
Following a five-week trial, a federal jury in Massachusetts found two Chinese nationals, one of whom resided in the United States, guilty of illegally conspiring to violate U.S. export laws and illegally exporting electronic equipment from the United States to China, the Justice Department announced today. Several Chinese military entities were among those receiving the exported equipment.
The jury also convicted a Waltham, Mass., corporation, owned by one of the defendants, which procured the equipment from U.S. suppliers and then exported the goods to China through Hong Kong. The exported equipment is used in electronic warfare, military radar, fire control, military guidance and control equipment and satellite communications, including global positioning systems.
Zhen Zhou Wu aka Alex Wu, Yufeng Wei aka Annie Wei and Chitron Electronics Inc. (Chitron-US), were convicted of unlawfully exporting defense articles and Commerce controlled goods to China on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2007 and conspiring to violate U.S. export laws over a period of ten years. Wu and Wei were also both convicted of filing false shipping documents with the Commerce Department. In addition, Wei was convicted of immigration fraud for presenting a U.S. Permanent Resident Card, which she knew had been procured by making false and fraudulent statements to immigration officials, to enter the country.
"Today’s convictions demonstrate the importance of safeguarding America’s sensitive technology against illicit foreign procurement efforts. They also serve as a warning to those who seek to covertly obtain technological materials from the U.S. in order to advance military systems of their own. I applaud the many agents, analysts and prosecutors who helped bring about this successful outcome," said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
Evidence presented at trial proved that the defendants illegally exported military electronic components, which are designated on the U.S. Munitions List, to mainland China, through Hong Kong, between April 2004 and June 2006. The defense articles the defendants illegally exported are primarily used in military phased array radar, electronic warfare, military guidance systems, and military satellite communications. Since 1990 the U.S. government has maintained an arms embargo against China that prohibits the export, re-export, or re-transfer of any defense article to China.
"For more than 10 years, this corporation and these defendants conspired to procure U.S. military products and other controlled electronic components for use in mainland China – for military radar, military satellite communications, and military guidance systems," said U.S. Attorney Ortiz. "In doing so, these defendants violated U.S. export laws and compromised our national security. The result in this case was achieved through the exemplary investigative efforts of dedicated agents and prosecutors working with various law enforcement and other government agencies."
The defendants also illegally exported Commerce Department-controlled electronics components to China that could be used in military applications in electronic warfare, military radar, satellite communications systems and space applications. These items could make a direct and significant contribution to weapons systems and war-fighting capabilities of U.S. adversaries, and cannot be exported to China without an export license from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Wu founded and controlled Chitron, including its headquarters in Shenzhen, China, and its U.S. office located in Waltham, Mass. While Wu resided in China, Wei served as the manager of the U.S. office. Using Chitron, Wu targeted Chinese military factories and military research institutes as customers of Chitron, including numerous institutes of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which is responsible for the procurement, development and manufacture of electronics for the Chinese military. Indeed, Wu referred to Chinese military entities as Chitron’s major customer since as early as 2002. Wu hired an engineer at Chitron’s Shenzhen office to work with Chinese military customers. By 2007, 25% of Chitron’s sales were to Chinese military entities.
Correspondence between Wu, Wei and other Chitron employees showed knowledge that U.S. export restricted parts were being shipped overseas to Chinese customers without having first obtained an export license. Wu instructed Wei and employees of Chitron-US on numerous occasions to never tell U.S. companies that parts were going overseas. At Wu and Wei’s direction, U.S. companies were told to ship all ordered products to the Chitron-US office located in Waltham, Mass.
Upon receipt by Chitron-US of the ordered products, the U.S. commodities were inspected by Chitron-US employees and consolidated into packages, which were then exported to the company’s Shenzhen office (located in Mainland China) using freight forwarders in Hong Kong, without the required export licenses from the Department of State and Department of Commerce.
"Today’s convictions represent an outstanding collaborative investigation and prosecution to bring to justice those who flout our export control laws and endanger our national security," said John McKenna, Special Agent in Charge of the Commerce Department’s Boston Office of Export Enforcement. "Preventing dangerous U.S.-origin items from falling into the wrong hands is one of our top priorities at the Commerce Department," he said.
"Today’s verdicts underscore the importance of ICE’s global investigative efforts aimed at disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations that profit from the illegal exportation of sensitive U.S. technology that threatens our national security," said "Matthew J. Etre, Acting Special Agent in Charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations in Boston.
"This was a significant verdict in a joint investigation with ICE, Commerce, DCIS, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office," said Warren Bamford, Special Agent in Charge of FBI’s Boston Field Office. "The illegal export of U.S. defense technology to foreign countries is harmful to the national security of the United States. These types of violations will continue to be aggressively investigated because this conduct cannot and will not be tolerated."
"The convictions in this case are the end result of a joint investigation conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and its partner federal law enforcement agencies," said Resident Agent In Charge Leigh-Alistair Barzey. "This investigation demonstrates the commitment DCIS has to ensuring that sensitive military equipment and technology are not illegally exported to restricted countries, which could put America’s war fighters and the Nation at considerable risk."
Wu and Wei both face up to 20 years in prison to be followed by three years supervised release and a $1 million fine. After serving their sentence, both will face deportation to China.
Chitron-US faces up to a $1 million fine for each count in the Indictment charging the company with illegal export of U.S. Munitions List items and $500,000 for each count in the Indictment charging them with illegal export of Commerce Department-controlled electronics. Sentencing is scheduled for August 17, 2010.
Shenzhen Chitron Electronics Company Limited, the Chinese company owned by Wu which received the U.S. electronics and delivered the parts to Chinese end-users, was also indicted for the same crimes. The court has entered a contempt order against Chitron-Shenzhen for refusing to appear for trial and fined the corporation $1.9 million dollars.
Co-defendant Bo Li, aka Eric Lee, previously pleaded guilty to making false statements on shipping documents, and faces five years in prison to be followed by three years supervised release and a $1 million fine. Sentencing is scheduled for July 22, 2010, in Boston.
The case was investigated by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; FBI; and Defense Criminal Investigative Service. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys B. Stephanie Siegmann and John A. Capin of Office Anti-Terrorism and National Security Unit for the District of Massachusetts.
10-580
National Security Division
Source: United States Department of Justice - http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-nsd-580.html
Two Chinese Nationals Convicted of Illegally Exporting Electronics Components Used in Military Radar & Electronic Warfare
Following a five-week trial, a federal jury in Massachusetts found two Chinese nationals, one of whom resided in the United States, guilty of illegally conspiring to violate U.S. export laws and illegally exporting electronic equipment from the United States to China, the Justice Department announced today. Several Chinese military entities were among those receiving the exported equipment.
The jury also convicted a Waltham, Mass., corporation, owned by one of the defendants, which procured the equipment from U.S. suppliers and then exported the goods to China through Hong Kong. The exported equipment is used in electronic warfare, military radar, fire control, military guidance and control equipment and satellite communications, including global positioning systems.
Zhen Zhou Wu aka Alex Wu, Yufeng Wei aka Annie Wei and Chitron Electronics Inc. (Chitron-US), were convicted of unlawfully exporting defense articles and Commerce controlled goods to China on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2007 and conspiring to violate U.S. export laws over a period of ten years. Wu and Wei were also both convicted of filing false shipping documents with the Commerce Department. In addition, Wei was convicted of immigration fraud for presenting a U.S. Permanent Resident Card, which she knew had been procured by making false and fraudulent statements to immigration officials, to enter the country.
"Today’s convictions demonstrate the importance of safeguarding America’s sensitive technology against illicit foreign procurement efforts. They also serve as a warning to those who seek to covertly obtain technological materials from the U.S. in order to advance military systems of their own. I applaud the many agents, analysts and prosecutors who helped bring about this successful outcome," said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
Evidence presented at trial proved that the defendants illegally exported military electronic components, which are designated on the U.S. Munitions List, to mainland China, through Hong Kong, between April 2004 and June 2006. The defense articles the defendants illegally exported are primarily used in military phased array radar, electronic warfare, military guidance systems, and military satellite communications. Since 1990 the U.S. government has maintained an arms embargo against China that prohibits the export, re-export, or re-transfer of any defense article to China.
"For more than 10 years, this corporation and these defendants conspired to procure U.S. military products and other controlled electronic components for use in mainland China – for military radar, military satellite communications, and military guidance systems," said U.S. Attorney Ortiz. "In doing so, these defendants violated U.S. export laws and compromised our national security. The result in this case was achieved through the exemplary investigative efforts of dedicated agents and prosecutors working with various law enforcement and other government agencies."
The defendants also illegally exported Commerce Department-controlled electronics components to China that could be used in military applications in electronic warfare, military radar, satellite communications systems and space applications. These items could make a direct and significant contribution to weapons systems and war-fighting capabilities of U.S. adversaries, and cannot be exported to China without an export license from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Wu founded and controlled Chitron, including its headquarters in Shenzhen, China, and its U.S. office located in Waltham, Mass. While Wu resided in China, Wei served as the manager of the U.S. office. Using Chitron, Wu targeted Chinese military factories and military research institutes as customers of Chitron, including numerous institutes of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which is responsible for the procurement, development and manufacture of electronics for the Chinese military. Indeed, Wu referred to Chinese military entities as Chitron’s major customer since as early as 2002. Wu hired an engineer at Chitron’s Shenzhen office to work with Chinese military customers. By 2007, 25% of Chitron’s sales were to Chinese military entities.
Correspondence between Wu, Wei and other Chitron employees showed knowledge that U.S. export restricted parts were being shipped overseas to Chinese customers without having first obtained an export license. Wu instructed Wei and employees of Chitron-US on numerous occasions to never tell U.S. companies that parts were going overseas. At Wu and Wei’s direction, U.S. companies were told to ship all ordered products to the Chitron-US office located in Waltham, Mass.
Upon receipt by Chitron-US of the ordered products, the U.S. commodities were inspected by Chitron-US employees and consolidated into packages, which were then exported to the company’s Shenzhen office (located in Mainland China) using freight forwarders in Hong Kong, without the required export licenses from the Department of State and Department of Commerce.
"Today’s convictions represent an outstanding collaborative investigation and prosecution to bring to justice those who flout our export control laws and endanger our national security," said John McKenna, Special Agent in Charge of the Commerce Department’s Boston Office of Export Enforcement. "Preventing dangerous U.S.-origin items from falling into the wrong hands is one of our top priorities at the Commerce Department," he said.
"Today’s verdicts underscore the importance of ICE’s global investigative efforts aimed at disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations that profit from the illegal exportation of sensitive U.S. technology that threatens our national security," said "Matthew J. Etre, Acting Special Agent in Charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations in Boston.
"This was a significant verdict in a joint investigation with ICE, Commerce, DCIS, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office," said Warren Bamford, Special Agent in Charge of FBI’s Boston Field Office. "The illegal export of U.S. defense technology to foreign countries is harmful to the national security of the United States. These types of violations will continue to be aggressively investigated because this conduct cannot and will not be tolerated."
"The convictions in this case are the end result of a joint investigation conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and its partner federal law enforcement agencies," said Resident Agent In Charge Leigh-Alistair Barzey. "This investigation demonstrates the commitment DCIS has to ensuring that sensitive military equipment and technology are not illegally exported to restricted countries, which could put America’s war fighters and the Nation at considerable risk."
Wu and Wei both face up to 20 years in prison to be followed by three years supervised release and a $1 million fine. After serving their sentence, both will face deportation to China.
Chitron-US faces up to a $1 million fine for each count in the Indictment charging the company with illegal export of U.S. Munitions List items and $500,000 for each count in the Indictment charging them with illegal export of Commerce Department-controlled electronics. Sentencing is scheduled for August 17, 2010.
Shenzhen Chitron Electronics Company Limited, the Chinese company owned by Wu which received the U.S. electronics and delivered the parts to Chinese end-users, was also indicted for the same crimes. The court has entered a contempt order against Chitron-Shenzhen for refusing to appear for trial and fined the corporation $1.9 million dollars.
Co-defendant Bo Li, aka Eric Lee, previously pleaded guilty to making false statements on shipping documents, and faces five years in prison to be followed by three years supervised release and a $1 million fine. Sentencing is scheduled for July 22, 2010, in Boston.
The case was investigated by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; FBI; and Defense Criminal Investigative Service. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys B. Stephanie Siegmann and John A. Capin of Office Anti-Terrorism and National Security Unit for the District of Massachusetts.
10-580
National Security Division
Monday, March 15, 2010
NAVPROP 11-19 PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS
NAVPROP 11-19 PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS
GIDEP Management Meeting
February 2, 2010
John Butler
NAVSEA 04P
PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING OF ELECTRONIC
COMPONENTS
• In general.—Chapter 25 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
• Department of Defense or the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)
Counterfeit Electronic Part
• A part that is an imitation or otherwise not genuine, or that is
substituted for, or otherwise misrepresented to be, the genuine part
required by the Government, or required, on behalf of the
Government, by any party to a Government contract, grant, other
transaction, cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements.
• A ‘counterfeit electronic part’ can be a part originally manufactured
to specifications or other Government requirement that has been
deliberately altered or tampered with so as to no longer represent
the original part but to give the appearance of being the original part
• Flow down of requirements - to its subcontractors, vendors, and
other entities at all tiers
Counterfeit electronic parts causing loss of life
• Whoever knowingly, under a contract, grant, other transaction,
cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements with the Department of Defense or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
• delivers an end item, component, or part containing or consisting of
a counterfeit electronic part for use in
• any national security system, weapons system, vessel, or vehicle,
• which after delivery causes the system, vessel, or vehicle to fail, or
causes a disruption of performance, and that failure or disruption
results in the loss of life, shall be punished,
• in the case of a corporation, partnership, business trust, association,
or other organization, by a fine under this title and, in the case of an
individual, by a fine under this title, or imprisonment for not more
than 25 years, or both
Counterfeit electronic parts without loss of life
• Whoever knowingly, under a contract, grant, other transaction,
cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements with the Department of Defense or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, delivers an end
item, component, or part containing or consisting of a counterfeit
electronic part for use in any national security system, weapons
system, vessel, or vehicle, which after delivery causes the system,
vessel, or vehicle to fail, or causes a disruption of performance, and
where it is not established that the failure or disruption resulted in
the loss of life, shall be punished, in the case of a corporation,
partnership, business trust, association, or other organization, by a
fine under this title and, in the case of an individual, by a fine under
this title, or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
Seizure and forfeiture of counterfeit electronic
• Any end item, component, or part containing or consisting of a
counterfeit electronic part purchased either for direct delivery, or for
incorporation into supplies to be delivered, in performance of a
contract, grant, other transaction, cooperative agreement, or other
instrument establishing Government requirements with the
Department of Defense or the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration that is determined to be counterfeit shall be
• subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States to prevent
such items from re-entering the stream of commerce.
• The supplier of end items ….. that are determined, in accordance
with agency regulations, to be counterfeit shall forfeit all right to
payment for such electronic end items, components, or parts
Exports of populated scrap circuit boards prohibited
• Whoever knowingly —
– sells, gives, or otherwise transfers a populated scrap circuit board
outside of the United States; or
– receives, conceals, or retains a populated scrap circuit board with the
intent to transfer the same outside of the United States,
• shall be punished, in the case of a corporation, partnership, business
trust, association, or other organization, by a fine under this title and, in
the case of an individual, by a fine under this title, imprisonment for not
more than 10 years, or both.
• Populated scrap circuit board - a used circuit board that contains
microchips and other electronic items needed to make it functional
Acceptance of Counterfeit Items
• Any Government acceptance of supplies later found to contain
counterfeit material shall be null and void and
• delivery of such material shall not constitute a valid basis for
payment of a contractor’s invoice
• If the United States …. or that party shall be entitled to recover the
payment. The United States may recover interest on any such
payment computed at the rate of interest established by the
Secretary of the Treasury ….
Responsibility to Retain and Preserve
• It shall be the responsibility of any party … who uncovers or ascertains
that an electronic end item, … is counterfeit or contains counterfeit
parts to retain and preserve such counterfeit material as evidence and
to
• report within five business days such counterfeit material to the
Government contracting officer.
• In addition, such party is responsible for submitting a ‘suspect
counterfeit report’ to the Government Industry Data Exchange
Program for
– incorporation into the Program’s database and
– transmission of an alert notification to other government agencies.
• A ‘suspect counterfeit report’ shall include
– a description of the counterfeit material, including its current condition, the
location of the counterfeit material, and the party’s point of contact for the
counterfeit material
Responsibility of Contracting Officer
• It shall be the responsibility of the Department of Defense or National
Aeronautics and Space Administration contracting officer who receives
a report of counterfeit material from a contractor to
– submit that report, within five business days of receipt, to the appropriate
investigative service and
– the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the military department, or the component
Contractor certifications and testing data
• Certifying or Signing Official
–When a contractor is required to execute a certification or to sign testing
data in performance of a Government contract with the DoD or NASA,
– whether or not such certifications or such testing data is submitted to the
Government,
– the contractor shall ensure that the certifying or signing official is clearly
identified on the certification or testing data in accordance with agency
regulations
• Lack of Compliance
– Any certification or any testing data that is not in compliance … shall be
invalid and there shall be no valid basis for acceptance of the supplies to
which such certification or testing data relates
Legislation Current Status
• Sent to OMB week of 25 January 2010
GIDEP Management Meeting
February 2, 2010
John Butler
NAVSEA 04P
PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING OF ELECTRONIC
COMPONENTS
• In general.—Chapter 25 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
• Department of Defense or the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)
Counterfeit Electronic Part
• A part that is an imitation or otherwise not genuine, or that is
substituted for, or otherwise misrepresented to be, the genuine part
required by the Government, or required, on behalf of the
Government, by any party to a Government contract, grant, other
transaction, cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements.
• A ‘counterfeit electronic part’ can be a part originally manufactured
to specifications or other Government requirement that has been
deliberately altered or tampered with so as to no longer represent
the original part but to give the appearance of being the original part
• Flow down of requirements - to its subcontractors, vendors, and
other entities at all tiers
Counterfeit electronic parts causing loss of life
• Whoever knowingly, under a contract, grant, other transaction,
cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements with the Department of Defense or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
• delivers an end item, component, or part containing or consisting of
a counterfeit electronic part for use in
• any national security system, weapons system, vessel, or vehicle,
• which after delivery causes the system, vessel, or vehicle to fail, or
causes a disruption of performance, and that failure or disruption
results in the loss of life, shall be punished,
• in the case of a corporation, partnership, business trust, association,
or other organization, by a fine under this title and, in the case of an
individual, by a fine under this title, or imprisonment for not more
than 25 years, or both
Counterfeit electronic parts without loss of life
• Whoever knowingly, under a contract, grant, other transaction,
cooperative agreement, or other instrument establishing
Government requirements with the Department of Defense or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, delivers an end
item, component, or part containing or consisting of a counterfeit
electronic part for use in any national security system, weapons
system, vessel, or vehicle, which after delivery causes the system,
vessel, or vehicle to fail, or causes a disruption of performance, and
where it is not established that the failure or disruption resulted in
the loss of life, shall be punished, in the case of a corporation,
partnership, business trust, association, or other organization, by a
fine under this title and, in the case of an individual, by a fine under
this title, or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
Seizure and forfeiture of counterfeit electronic
• Any end item, component, or part containing or consisting of a
counterfeit electronic part purchased either for direct delivery, or for
incorporation into supplies to be delivered, in performance of a
contract, grant, other transaction, cooperative agreement, or other
instrument establishing Government requirements with the
Department of Defense or the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration that is determined to be counterfeit shall be
• subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States to prevent
such items from re-entering the stream of commerce.
• The supplier of end items ….. that are determined, in accordance
with agency regulations, to be counterfeit shall forfeit all right to
payment for such electronic end items, components, or parts
Exports of populated scrap circuit boards prohibited
• Whoever knowingly —
– sells, gives, or otherwise transfers a populated scrap circuit board
outside of the United States; or
– receives, conceals, or retains a populated scrap circuit board with the
intent to transfer the same outside of the United States,
• shall be punished, in the case of a corporation, partnership, business
trust, association, or other organization, by a fine under this title and, in
the case of an individual, by a fine under this title, imprisonment for not
more than 10 years, or both.
• Populated scrap circuit board - a used circuit board that contains
microchips and other electronic items needed to make it functional
Acceptance of Counterfeit Items
• Any Government acceptance of supplies later found to contain
counterfeit material shall be null and void and
• delivery of such material shall not constitute a valid basis for
payment of a contractor’s invoice
• If the United States …. or that party shall be entitled to recover the
payment. The United States may recover interest on any such
payment computed at the rate of interest established by the
Secretary of the Treasury ….
Responsibility to Retain and Preserve
• It shall be the responsibility of any party … who uncovers or ascertains
that an electronic end item, … is counterfeit or contains counterfeit
parts to retain and preserve such counterfeit material as evidence and
to
• report within five business days such counterfeit material to the
Government contracting officer.
• In addition, such party is responsible for submitting a ‘suspect
counterfeit report’ to the Government Industry Data Exchange
Program for
– incorporation into the Program’s database and
– transmission of an alert notification to other government agencies.
• A ‘suspect counterfeit report’ shall include
– a description of the counterfeit material, including its current condition, the
location of the counterfeit material, and the party’s point of contact for the
counterfeit material
Responsibility of Contracting Officer
• It shall be the responsibility of the Department of Defense or National
Aeronautics and Space Administration contracting officer who receives
a report of counterfeit material from a contractor to
– submit that report, within five business days of receipt, to the appropriate
investigative service and
– the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the military department, or the component
Contractor certifications and testing data
• Certifying or Signing Official
–When a contractor is required to execute a certification or to sign testing
data in performance of a Government contract with the DoD or NASA,
– whether or not such certifications or such testing data is submitted to the
Government,
– the contractor shall ensure that the certifying or signing official is clearly
identified on the certification or testing data in accordance with agency
regulations
• Lack of Compliance
– Any certification or any testing data that is not in compliance … shall be
invalid and there shall be no valid basis for acceptance of the supplies to
which such certification or testing data relates
Legislation Current Status
• Sent to OMB week of 25 January 2010
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Intel, Newegg Investigate Sale Of Fake Chips
By Edward J. Correia, Scott Campbell, ChannelWeb
9:23 PM EST Mon. Mar. 08, 2010
-->
-->--> --> -->Newegg and Intel (NSDQ:INTC) said they are investigating how the company could have received, and then sold, counterfeit Intel processors to customers, according to the company.
Late last week, the first claims surfaced that Newegg had sold fake Intel processors after at least one customer posted photos and other information of the allegedly fake products, to the Internet.
The "CPUs" in question were purchased between Mar. 1, and Mar. 4, according to a Newegg statement, and have FPO/BATCH# 3938B006 printed on the packaging. "Additionally, the Part Number on the heat sink will read CNFN936612 and there will be no wiring on the heat sink itself," according to the statement.
In an initial statement, Newegg also referred to a shipping error with certain recent orders involving one of its partners mistakenly sending "a small number of demo boxes instead of functional units." While feasible on its face, photos of the pretend processor packaging [http://www.overclockers.com/forums/showthread.php?p=6422351#post6422351] told a different story. The demo units were counterfeit.
Newegg subsequently released another statement Monday night naming Ipex Infotech of Fremont, Calif., as the supplier from which it received the fake processors. Newegg was told by Ipex that Ipex mistakely shipped demo units, according to Newegg.
"We have since come to discover the CPUs were counterfeit and are terminating our relationship with this supplier," according to Newegg.
D&H Distributing Co. Inc., a Harrisburg, Pa.-based distributor, was initially " and incorrectly " reported in some accounts to be the supplier of the counterfeit processors. Newegg confirmed that D&H had nothing to do with the fake CPUs.
"Contrary to any speculation, D&H Distributing is not the vendor that supplied us with the Intel Core i7-920 CPUs in question," Newegg said in the latter statement.
In a statement issued to CRN, a senior D&H executive said "D&H takes this issue very seriously, as does the entire online and IT community, and we are anxious to see it resolved to the satisfaction of everyone involved. D&H has never bought anything other than genuine Intel product, sourced directly from Intel, and were very concerned that our name was inadvertently involved. We are very proud of the integrity we've built over our 92 years, and we are glad to see that the D&H name has been vindicated."
Meanwhile, a spokesperson at Ipex Infotech Inc., a Fremont, Calif.-based distributor, said the company is "still looking for legal consulting" and could not offer any further comment on the issue.
Newegg said it is reaching out to all customers who may have been received the fake processors.
"We have already sent out a number of replacement units and are doing everything in our power to resolve the matter promptly and with the least amount of inconvenience to our customers," Newegg said in a statement.
Intel said it was also investigating the matter. "Intel is getting samples to inspect and until then we can say that everything in the package appears fake," Daniel Snyder, an Intel spokesman, said in a statement, according to The Wall Street Journal.
9:23 PM EST Mon. Mar. 08, 2010
-->
-->--> --> -->Newegg and Intel (NSDQ:INTC) said they are investigating how the company could have received, and then sold, counterfeit Intel processors to customers, according to the company.
Late last week, the first claims surfaced that Newegg had sold fake Intel processors after at least one customer posted photos and other information of the allegedly fake products, to the Internet.
The "CPUs" in question were purchased between Mar. 1, and Mar. 4, according to a Newegg statement, and have FPO/BATCH# 3938B006 printed on the packaging. "Additionally, the Part Number on the heat sink will read CNFN936612 and there will be no wiring on the heat sink itself," according to the statement.
In an initial statement, Newegg also referred to a shipping error with certain recent orders involving one of its partners mistakenly sending "a small number of demo boxes instead of functional units." While feasible on its face, photos of the pretend processor packaging [http://www.overclockers.com/forums/showthread.php?p=6422351#post6422351] told a different story. The demo units were counterfeit.
Newegg subsequently released another statement Monday night naming Ipex Infotech of Fremont, Calif., as the supplier from which it received the fake processors. Newegg was told by Ipex that Ipex mistakely shipped demo units, according to Newegg.
"We have since come to discover the CPUs were counterfeit and are terminating our relationship with this supplier," according to Newegg.
D&H Distributing Co. Inc., a Harrisburg, Pa.-based distributor, was initially " and incorrectly " reported in some accounts to be the supplier of the counterfeit processors. Newegg confirmed that D&H had nothing to do with the fake CPUs.
"Contrary to any speculation, D&H Distributing is not the vendor that supplied us with the Intel Core i7-920 CPUs in question," Newegg said in the latter statement.
In a statement issued to CRN, a senior D&H executive said "D&H takes this issue very seriously, as does the entire online and IT community, and we are anxious to see it resolved to the satisfaction of everyone involved. D&H has never bought anything other than genuine Intel product, sourced directly from Intel, and were very concerned that our name was inadvertently involved. We are very proud of the integrity we've built over our 92 years, and we are glad to see that the D&H name has been vindicated."
Meanwhile, a spokesperson at Ipex Infotech Inc., a Fremont, Calif.-based distributor, said the company is "still looking for legal consulting" and could not offer any further comment on the issue.
Newegg said it is reaching out to all customers who may have been received the fake processors.
"We have already sent out a number of replacement units and are doing everything in our power to resolve the matter promptly and with the least amount of inconvenience to our customers," Newegg said in a statement.
Intel said it was also investigating the matter. "Intel is getting samples to inspect and until then we can say that everything in the package appears fake," Daniel Snyder, an Intel spokesman, said in a statement, according to The Wall Street Journal.
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Zdi partners with Finisar to globally represent and distribute its products.
For Immediate Release:
Zdi partners with Finisar to globally represent and distribute its products.
Largo, FL, February 16, 2010
ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc., with 18 years of experience in electronic component distribution, and Finisar Corporation, a Manufacturer of Optic Components and Sub Systems, have entered into an agreement allowing Zdi to represent and sell it’s products globally that will provide a suite of material management services for customers who build, maintain and upgrade high reliability data switching systems. The relationship capitalizes on the experience gained by both companies working in technology for 2 decades.
“Zdi has matured as a global leader in Supply Chain Services in the market place. Our global footprint, market knowledge and unrivaled quality process makes us a distributor of choice. We are the preferred supply chain partner of technology companies,” stated Craig Zurman, founder and CEO of ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. “We have developed the expertise to verify the quality of incoming products and the facilities to store and distribute those products in a controlled environment for periods of time exceeding 10 years”, said Zurman.
“The ability of ZD Integrated Circuits material management and distribution capabilities with Finisar’s leading optic products create a distribution partnership that is uniquely positioned to provide services to the Original Equipment Manufacturers and Electronic Manufacturing Services companies” said Gavin Blackett of Finisar. Blackett explained that “we recognize the value of how Zdi can provide relationships with their Military Prime Contract customer base and can assist us with open item returns and re-distribute these items to the market place with their Technology Remarketing Programs.”
About ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc.
ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. operates as an electronic component distributor to a large customer base of contract electronic manufacturers and original equipment manufacturers. With offices in Florida, Tennessee, Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China, ZD Integrated Circuits offers purchasing services as well as third party logistics, warehousing and supply chain management programs. ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. has been in the electronics industry for 18 years with an exemplary record of sales and service to thousands of customers around the world.
About Finisar Corporation Internet video, high-definition television, Voice over Internet (VoIP), and the exploding volume and growth of enterprise data - these factors drive a global explosion in the world's need for information and bandwidth. Optical communications are the foundation. For more than 20 years, Finisar has provided optical components and modules that enable high-speed voice, video and data communications for networking, storage, wireless, and cable TV applications.
Zdi partners with Finisar to globally represent and distribute its products.
Largo, FL, February 16, 2010
ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc., with 18 years of experience in electronic component distribution, and Finisar Corporation, a Manufacturer of Optic Components and Sub Systems, have entered into an agreement allowing Zdi to represent and sell it’s products globally that will provide a suite of material management services for customers who build, maintain and upgrade high reliability data switching systems. The relationship capitalizes on the experience gained by both companies working in technology for 2 decades.
“Zdi has matured as a global leader in Supply Chain Services in the market place. Our global footprint, market knowledge and unrivaled quality process makes us a distributor of choice. We are the preferred supply chain partner of technology companies,” stated Craig Zurman, founder and CEO of ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. “We have developed the expertise to verify the quality of incoming products and the facilities to store and distribute those products in a controlled environment for periods of time exceeding 10 years”, said Zurman.
“The ability of ZD Integrated Circuits material management and distribution capabilities with Finisar’s leading optic products create a distribution partnership that is uniquely positioned to provide services to the Original Equipment Manufacturers and Electronic Manufacturing Services companies” said Gavin Blackett of Finisar. Blackett explained that “we recognize the value of how Zdi can provide relationships with their Military Prime Contract customer base and can assist us with open item returns and re-distribute these items to the market place with their Technology Remarketing Programs.”
About ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc.
ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. operates as an electronic component distributor to a large customer base of contract electronic manufacturers and original equipment manufacturers. With offices in Florida, Tennessee, Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China, ZD Integrated Circuits offers purchasing services as well as third party logistics, warehousing and supply chain management programs. ZD Integrated Circuits, Inc. has been in the electronics industry for 18 years with an exemplary record of sales and service to thousands of customers around the world.
About Finisar Corporation Internet video, high-definition television, Voice over Internet (VoIP), and the exploding volume and growth of enterprise data - these factors drive a global explosion in the world's need for information and bandwidth. Optical communications are the foundation. For more than 20 years, Finisar has provided optical components and modules that enable high-speed voice, video and data communications for networking, storage, wireless, and cable TV applications.
Monday, February 1, 2010
California MVP Micro, Inc. Owner Pleads Guilty in Connection with Sales of Counterfeit High Tech Parts to the U.S. Military
Source: United States Attorney’s Office
District of Columbia
Channing D. Phillips
United States Attorney
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE USAO Public Affairs
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 (202) 514-6933
www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc
–Counterfeit integrated circuits sold to the United States Navy–
Washington, D.C. - Mustafa Abdul Aljaff, 30, of Newport Coast, California, pleaded guilty today to Counts One and Six of an Indictment charging him and others with Conspiracy to Traffic in Counterfeit Goods and to Defraud the United States, and Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, announced U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips, Special Agent in Charge John Torres, Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), Washington, D.C., Special Agent in Charge Sandy Macisaac, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Washington, D.C., Special Agent in Charge C. André Martin, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Criminal Investigation, Washington, D.C. Field Office, and Special Agent in Charge, Washington Regional Office, Kathryn Jones, U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG).
The guilty plea was entered before U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah Robinson. Aljaff faces a statutory sentence for the crime of Conspiracy of up to 5 years’ incarceration, a fine of $250,000, a one-year term of supervised release, and an order of restitution. For the crime of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, he faces up to 10 years’ incarceration, a fine of $2,000,000, a three-year term of supervised release, an order of restitution, and an order of forfeiture and destruction for articles bearing or consisting of counterfeit marks and for any property used to commit or facilitate the commission of the offense.
As part of the plea agreement, Aljaff agreed to forfeit to the United States industrial machinery which is designed to be used in the examination, testing, packaging, de-marking, and marking of integrated circuits, computer network servers, and his integrated circuit inventory, all of which was seized from his business location in connection with the execution of a search warrant on October 8, 2009. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Aljaff faces a sentence of as much as 46 to 57 months’ incarceration, depending on certain factual issues to be decided by the sentencing court. Aljaff’s sentencing will likely occur in the Summer of 2010, before the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. District Court Judge, before whom the case is pending.
The guilty plea arises in connection with an eleven-count Indictment, unsealed on October 8, 2009, which charges Mustafa Abdul Aljaff, 30, his sister, Marwah Felahy (formerly Aljaff), 32, and her husband, Neil Felahy, 32, all of Newport Coast, California, with Conspiracy, Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services, and Mail Fraud, in connection with their sale of counterfeit integrated circuits to the United States Navy.
As described in the Indictment and other pleadings filed with the court, integrated circuits are a type of semiconductor that function as amplifiers, oscillators, timers, counters, computer memory, and microprocessors. Integrated circuits are used in a wide array of modern electronic products including consumer electronics and transportation, medical, aircraft, spacecraft, and military applications. The use of counterfeit integrated circuits can result in product malfunction or failure, and can also cause serious bodily injury from electrocution and, in some circumstances, death. Markings on integrated circuits indicate a part is “commercial-grade,” “industrial-grade,” or “military grade.” Military grade markings signify that the part has been specially manufactured, among other things, to withstand extreme temperature ranges and high rates of vibration. Legitimate manufacturers subject such parts to specialized testing not used in the production of differently graded parts. Military grade integrated circuits are sold to the U.S. Military at a higher price than commercial or industrial grade parts because of the special manufacture and testing required.
According to the Indictment and other documents filed with the court, Aljaff and others engaged in the interstate trafficking of counterfeit integrated circuits, in a variety of ways. First, they acquired counterfeit integrated circuits from supply sources in China, imported them into the United States, and sold them via the Internet. Second, they acquired counterfeit integrated circuits from other distributors within the United States. Third, they obtained integrated circuits then sent them to another entity where the original markings were removed and the devices were remarked with that or another trademark and other markings thereby fraudulently indicating, among other things, that the devices were of a certain brand, and were newer, higher quality or of a certain grade, including military grade. Fourth, the defendants “harvested” dies from integrated circuits then sent them to another entity where they were repackaged to appear new, including trademarks and other markings indicating that the devices were of a certain brand, higher quality or were of a certain grade.
Aljaff and others are alleged to have operated the conspiracy through a number of California companies: MVP Micro, Inc., BeBe Starr, Consulting, Inc., Red Hat Distributors, Inc. (also known as “RH Distributors,” and “Red Hot Distributors”), Force-One Electronics, Inc., Labra, Inc., subsequently renamed Labra Electronics, Inc., then Becker Components, Inc., and Pentagon Components, Inc. They also operated websites related to those companies, including: www.mvpmicro.com, www.labrainc.com, www.rhdistributors.com, and www.pentagoncomponents.com.
The Indictment charged that on March 3, 2009, June 26, 2009, and July 14, 2009, Aljaff and others entered into contracts with the U.S. Navy and other government agencies for the sales of integrated circuits. Subsequently, they shipped integrated circuits bearing false, counterfeit trademarks to the U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C. During the proceedings today, Aljaff agreed that on 23 separate occasions, that he and others imported into the United States from China and Hong Kong, approximately 13,073 integrated circuits bearing counterfeit trade marks, including military-grade markings, valued at approximately $140,835.50. Those counterfeit integrated circuits bore the purported trademarks of a number of legitimate companies, including: Fujitsu, Analog Devices, Inc., Atmel Corporation, ST Microelectronics, Inc., Altera Corporation, Intel Corporation, Elantec Semiconductor, Inc., TDK Corporation, National Semiconductor, Inc., and VIA Technologies, Inc.
“Product counterfeiting, particularly of items for use by our armed forces, creates a risk to public safety and national security. There is also a concomitant harm to the economy and to those trademark holders whose creativity, investment of resources, and hard work brought the goods to market, said U.S. Attorney Phillips. “We will aggressively prosecute those who engage in product counterfeiting and who expose our military, other industry sectors, and the public to harm.”
“This investigation demonstrates the successes that can be achieved through the collaborative efforts of the private sector and the federal government to halt the importation and distribution of counterfeit commodities,” said John P. Torres, Special Agent in Charge for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Washington Field Office. “ICE remains committed to aggressively pursuing individuals and organizations engaging in intellectual property rights crimes that threaten the safety of the American public.” Kathryn Jones, Special Agent in Charge with the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General, added, "Working with our law enforcement colleagues and the Department of Justice, we are committed to preventing, detecting and prosecuting transportation fraud and corruption. We will continue our efforts to uncover suspect unapproved parts, prevent their use, and punish those who seek to compromise the integrity of DOT’s safety program.”
“NCIS continues to aggressively pursue individuals who sell counterfeit goods to the Department of the Navy, as it undermines the Navy's ability to defend the nation. The integrity of the war fighting capabilities of our country is dependent upon ensuring the highest possible quality of the systems, machines and technology used by our service members. This case represents how close coordination and partnership between NCIS, ICE and the Department of Justice can achieve success in thwarting defective material from entering the Navy's supply chain,” said Sandy MacIsaac, Special Agent in Charge, NCIS, Washington Field Office, Washington D.C.
In announcing the guilty plea today, U.S. Attorney Phillips, Special Agent in Charge Macisaac, Special Agent in Charge Torres, Special Agent in Charge Jones, and Special Agent in Charge Martin commended the work of ICE Special Agent Misty Price, NCIS Assistant Program and Operations Director for Economic Crimes, Marie R. Acevedo, NCIS Special Agents Erin Michaels and Stewart Thompson (Ret.), NCIS Forensic Auditor Stephen Green, IRS Special Agent Troy Burrus, US DOT Special Agent Jameel Bagby, and the staff of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including Paralegals Carolyn Cody, Diane Hayes, Sarah Reis, Sierra Tate, Mary Treanor, Maggie McCabe, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Sherri L. Schornstein, who is prosecuting the case. They also acknowledged the Semiconductor Industry Association, STMicroelectronics, Inc., Texas Instruments, Inc., Analog Devices, Inc., and National Semiconductor, Inc. for their cooperation and assistance. Also acknowledged were the Customs and Border Protection Officers who prevented counterfeit goods from entering the United States via stops of certain shipments at the U.S. ports of entry.
Source: United States Attorney’s Office
District of Columbia
Channing D. Phillips
United States Attorney
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE USAO Public Affairs
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 (202) 514-6933
www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc
–Counterfeit integrated circuits sold to the United States Navy–
Washington, D.C. - Mustafa Abdul Aljaff, 30, of Newport Coast, California, pleaded guilty today to Counts One and Six of an Indictment charging him and others with Conspiracy to Traffic in Counterfeit Goods and to Defraud the United States, and Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, announced U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips, Special Agent in Charge John Torres, Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), Washington, D.C., Special Agent in Charge Sandy Macisaac, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Washington, D.C., Special Agent in Charge C. André Martin, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Criminal Investigation, Washington, D.C. Field Office, and Special Agent in Charge, Washington Regional Office, Kathryn Jones, U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG).
The guilty plea was entered before U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah Robinson. Aljaff faces a statutory sentence for the crime of Conspiracy of up to 5 years’ incarceration, a fine of $250,000, a one-year term of supervised release, and an order of restitution. For the crime of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, he faces up to 10 years’ incarceration, a fine of $2,000,000, a three-year term of supervised release, an order of restitution, and an order of forfeiture and destruction for articles bearing or consisting of counterfeit marks and for any property used to commit or facilitate the commission of the offense.
As part of the plea agreement, Aljaff agreed to forfeit to the United States industrial machinery which is designed to be used in the examination, testing, packaging, de-marking, and marking of integrated circuits, computer network servers, and his integrated circuit inventory, all of which was seized from his business location in connection with the execution of a search warrant on October 8, 2009. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Aljaff faces a sentence of as much as 46 to 57 months’ incarceration, depending on certain factual issues to be decided by the sentencing court. Aljaff’s sentencing will likely occur in the Summer of 2010, before the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. District Court Judge, before whom the case is pending.
The guilty plea arises in connection with an eleven-count Indictment, unsealed on October 8, 2009, which charges Mustafa Abdul Aljaff, 30, his sister, Marwah Felahy (formerly Aljaff), 32, and her husband, Neil Felahy, 32, all of Newport Coast, California, with Conspiracy, Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services, and Mail Fraud, in connection with their sale of counterfeit integrated circuits to the United States Navy.
As described in the Indictment and other pleadings filed with the court, integrated circuits are a type of semiconductor that function as amplifiers, oscillators, timers, counters, computer memory, and microprocessors. Integrated circuits are used in a wide array of modern electronic products including consumer electronics and transportation, medical, aircraft, spacecraft, and military applications. The use of counterfeit integrated circuits can result in product malfunction or failure, and can also cause serious bodily injury from electrocution and, in some circumstances, death. Markings on integrated circuits indicate a part is “commercial-grade,” “industrial-grade,” or “military grade.” Military grade markings signify that the part has been specially manufactured, among other things, to withstand extreme temperature ranges and high rates of vibration. Legitimate manufacturers subject such parts to specialized testing not used in the production of differently graded parts. Military grade integrated circuits are sold to the U.S. Military at a higher price than commercial or industrial grade parts because of the special manufacture and testing required.
According to the Indictment and other documents filed with the court, Aljaff and others engaged in the interstate trafficking of counterfeit integrated circuits, in a variety of ways. First, they acquired counterfeit integrated circuits from supply sources in China, imported them into the United States, and sold them via the Internet. Second, they acquired counterfeit integrated circuits from other distributors within the United States. Third, they obtained integrated circuits then sent them to another entity where the original markings were removed and the devices were remarked with that or another trademark and other markings thereby fraudulently indicating, among other things, that the devices were of a certain brand, and were newer, higher quality or of a certain grade, including military grade. Fourth, the defendants “harvested” dies from integrated circuits then sent them to another entity where they were repackaged to appear new, including trademarks and other markings indicating that the devices were of a certain brand, higher quality or were of a certain grade.
Aljaff and others are alleged to have operated the conspiracy through a number of California companies: MVP Micro, Inc., BeBe Starr, Consulting, Inc., Red Hat Distributors, Inc. (also known as “RH Distributors,” and “Red Hot Distributors”), Force-One Electronics, Inc., Labra, Inc., subsequently renamed Labra Electronics, Inc., then Becker Components, Inc., and Pentagon Components, Inc. They also operated websites related to those companies, including: www.mvpmicro.com, www.labrainc.com, www.rhdistributors.com, and www.pentagoncomponents.com.
The Indictment charged that on March 3, 2009, June 26, 2009, and July 14, 2009, Aljaff and others entered into contracts with the U.S. Navy and other government agencies for the sales of integrated circuits. Subsequently, they shipped integrated circuits bearing false, counterfeit trademarks to the U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C. During the proceedings today, Aljaff agreed that on 23 separate occasions, that he and others imported into the United States from China and Hong Kong, approximately 13,073 integrated circuits bearing counterfeit trade marks, including military-grade markings, valued at approximately $140,835.50. Those counterfeit integrated circuits bore the purported trademarks of a number of legitimate companies, including: Fujitsu, Analog Devices, Inc., Atmel Corporation, ST Microelectronics, Inc., Altera Corporation, Intel Corporation, Elantec Semiconductor, Inc., TDK Corporation, National Semiconductor, Inc., and VIA Technologies, Inc.
“Product counterfeiting, particularly of items for use by our armed forces, creates a risk to public safety and national security. There is also a concomitant harm to the economy and to those trademark holders whose creativity, investment of resources, and hard work brought the goods to market, said U.S. Attorney Phillips. “We will aggressively prosecute those who engage in product counterfeiting and who expose our military, other industry sectors, and the public to harm.”
“This investigation demonstrates the successes that can be achieved through the collaborative efforts of the private sector and the federal government to halt the importation and distribution of counterfeit commodities,” said John P. Torres, Special Agent in Charge for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Washington Field Office. “ICE remains committed to aggressively pursuing individuals and organizations engaging in intellectual property rights crimes that threaten the safety of the American public.” Kathryn Jones, Special Agent in Charge with the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General, added, "Working with our law enforcement colleagues and the Department of Justice, we are committed to preventing, detecting and prosecuting transportation fraud and corruption. We will continue our efforts to uncover suspect unapproved parts, prevent their use, and punish those who seek to compromise the integrity of DOT’s safety program.”
“NCIS continues to aggressively pursue individuals who sell counterfeit goods to the Department of the Navy, as it undermines the Navy's ability to defend the nation. The integrity of the war fighting capabilities of our country is dependent upon ensuring the highest possible quality of the systems, machines and technology used by our service members. This case represents how close coordination and partnership between NCIS, ICE and the Department of Justice can achieve success in thwarting defective material from entering the Navy's supply chain,” said Sandy MacIsaac, Special Agent in Charge, NCIS, Washington Field Office, Washington D.C.
In announcing the guilty plea today, U.S. Attorney Phillips, Special Agent in Charge Macisaac, Special Agent in Charge Torres, Special Agent in Charge Jones, and Special Agent in Charge Martin commended the work of ICE Special Agent Misty Price, NCIS Assistant Program and Operations Director for Economic Crimes, Marie R. Acevedo, NCIS Special Agents Erin Michaels and Stewart Thompson (Ret.), NCIS Forensic Auditor Stephen Green, IRS Special Agent Troy Burrus, US DOT Special Agent Jameel Bagby, and the staff of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including Paralegals Carolyn Cody, Diane Hayes, Sarah Reis, Sierra Tate, Mary Treanor, Maggie McCabe, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Sherri L. Schornstein, who is prosecuting the case. They also acknowledged the Semiconductor Industry Association, STMicroelectronics, Inc., Texas Instruments, Inc., Analog Devices, Inc., and National Semiconductor, Inc. for their cooperation and assistance. Also acknowledged were the Customs and Border Protection Officers who prevented counterfeit goods from entering the United States via stops of certain shipments at the U.S. ports of entry.
Monday, January 25, 2010
Zdi Releases New Website
After several years of development we have finally released our new website.
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